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Ethiopian New Year
As this year (September 11, 2019; in Gregorian Calendar) in Ethiopia comes to a close, tomorrow will be the start of a New Year,
"Ethiopian New Year!" At this time of the year, the rainy season is coming to an end, and this holy land will begin to be covered
with yellow maskal daisies and the people in their new holiday clothes will go to visit relatives for joyful feasting.
According to legend, it is said, this is the day that Makeda, Queen of Sheba returned to her kingdom pregnant with King Solomon's
son, Menelik I, who would establish Ethiopia's Imperial Dynasty. Upon welcoming her home, it is said, her nobles gave her enqu
(jewels), hence the holiday being known as "enqutatash."
As each year is respectfully named after one of the Four Evangelists (Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John), this year the Ethiopian
Orthodox Tewahedo Church upon heralding the New Year will be celebrating Kidus Yohannes (John the Baptist) who heralded the
coming of Christ.
May the Almighty Creator grant for all Ethiopians, at home and abroad, a year filled with joy, love, peace, good health, and
prosperity. ����������
መልካም አዲስ ዓመት!!! 2012
Melkam Addis Amet!!! 2012
Happy New Year!!! 2012
Ye Amet Yohannes New (This is the year of St. John)
Source: Tsega Tekle Haimanot ~ FB Post ~ 11 September 2019
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The Battle of Adwa (1896) and the Victory of Adwa Centenary Medal
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The Battle of Adwa, in which Ethiopian forces under Emperor Menelik II united to defeat an
invading force of Italian troops, was one of the most significant turning points in the history of
modern Africa. It occurred, in 1896, when the “colonial era” was well advanced on the African
continent, and it served notice that Africa was not just there “for the taking” by European powers.
More than this, it marked the entry of Ethiopia into the modern community of nations: Menelik’s
victory over the Italians caused the other major European states, and Italy itself, to recognise
Ethiopia as a sovereign, independent state in the context of modern statecraft.
The actual battle which took place on March 1 and 2, 1896, at Adwa, the principal market town of
the North of Ethiopia, had been precipitated by the great rush of the European powers to colonise
Africa. Italy and Germany had lagged behind other European powers — most notably France and
Britain — in seizing large parcels of the Continent to colonise. Thus, the Conference of Berlin was
convened in 1884-85 to “divide up” the remainder of Africa among the other European powers,
anxious to obtain their own African colonies to satisfy the urge for imperial expansion and
economic gain. Italy was “awarded” Ethiopia; all that remained was for Italian troops to take
possession.
Significantly, until this time, Ethiopia had been left alone by the European powers. Its coastal
littoral was well-known to traders, but the heartland in the highlands was peopled by nations
notoriously unwilling to accept and embrace external contact and influence. But the Ethiopian
nations had been known in the past to be fractious and divided, and from all accounts, Italy’s
leaders expected a rapid conquest of the individual national leaders. Britain had, in 1868, waged a
successful war against Emperor Téwodros II (Theodore), leading to his death. The Italians,
however, failed to recognise that Emperor Menelik II had re-shaped Ethiopia since he came to
power in 1889, uniting its various kings and leaders, and creating in the process a substantial army,
outnumbering and outperforming the invading Italian professional army of 17,000 to 20,000 men.
The modern parallel to the situation came with the Israeli-Egyptian confrontations of 1967 and
1973. The Israeli victory in 1967 (the Six-Day War) left Israel complacent and confident in the
superiority of its forces over those of the Egyptians. Apart from this, the Israelis had put in place
the Bar-Lev Line of fortifications, which were expected to hold against any conceivable Egyptian
attack. But the Israeli leadership and intelligence services failed to note that the crushing defeat
inflicted on Egypt so quickly in 1967 had brought about a dramatic transformation in the psyche of
the Egyptian leadership. President Anwar as-Sadat totally transformed the education, training,
equipment and doctrine of the Egyptian Armed Forces, without Soviet help (Soviet advisors had
been expelled in 1972), within six years of the defeat. When Egypt initiated the October 1973 war,
the transformed situation took Israel by complete surprise. Despite the massive logistical re-supply
of Israel by the US — which effectively saved Israel from complete humiliation — and the recovery
of initiative by Israeli commanders, Egypt achieved its strategic objectives. The Suez Canal was re-
opened, the Sinai returned to Egypt, and peace achieved.
That the Battle of Adwa is still fresh in the minds of Ethiopians became apparent when, on July 5,
1998, Ethiopian volunteers were cheered off to battle against invading Eritrean forces. As a Reuters
report noted: “Residents from the city’s [Addis Ababa’s] 265 neighbourhood associations danced
and sang songs recalling the Battle of Adwa where Ethiopia defeated the invading Italian army in
1896.”
With even less intelligence on which to base its actions, Italy could only draw on the British victory
at Magdàla and the commonly held European belief that no African forces were a match for
disciplined and well-equipped European military formations.
But much had happened since Magdàla, and Emperor Téwodros’ defeat. Indeed, the British victory
had even at that time obscured from General Robert Napier and his officers the sophistication of
the system which they had just defeated. Victory often breeds contempt in the victors against the
vanquished; at best it breeds an unwillingness to learn from the enemy so recently crushed.
Apart from the overall political and social aspects of Ethiopia in 1868, Emperor Téwodros had
based his defence against the British on the Rist-Gult system of recruitment, military structure and
logistical support. This logistical structure was entrenched in what was commonly called Mesfint
Hagr: namely, the present day highlands of Eritrea, the region of Tigré, Gonder, Gojjam, and Wello.
The rest of Ethiopia was under a second type of resource system known as the Geber Madriya
system, which formed the basis of the fiscal and military organisation of Emperor Menelik’s
Government.
The Rist-Gult system was used not only at Magdàla, but also against Egypt at Gundet (1875), Gura
(1876), Italy at Dogali (1887), and against the Mahdist Sudan at Metemma (1889). [It was in this
battle, at Metemma, that Emperor Yohannes IV had died.] The Battle of Adwa was based mostly on
the Geber Madriya system. Ethiopian historian Tsegaye Tegenu noted that in all of these large
battles, the background composition of the troops were similar. “All were drawn from the various
ethnic groups and constituted the class of military nobility, regional aristocracy and peasantry.
However, there was a difference in the manner of administration and the use of human and
material resources [at Adwa]. The troops of Adwa were recruited basically through the Geber
Madriya system, which had qualitatively different methods of remuneration, revenue
administration and provisioning, which was in harmony with the form of economy.”
One of the major failings of the Italian planners of Savoyard Italy was that they failed to notice the
fundamental change in Ethiopia under Menelik. Emperor Menelik II had transformed the
administration of the economy and had greatly improved the tax base of the country. This in turn
improved dramatically his capability to raise armies and to equip them.
The complex tax base meant that the battles fought during the era of the Rist-Gult system were
precariously-managed affairs. As Tsegaye Tegenu noted: “It is not difficult to see the desperate
effort of the kings to overcome the fiscal limits of the system to fight against external aggression.”
And Menelik managed this transformation to a new economic base in such a way as to prepare
Ethiopia for the most decisive battle.
Emperor Menelik took immediate steps upon hearing of Italy’s plans to annexe Ethiopia. He called,
on September 17, 1895, for national mobilisation, and within two months more than 100,000
troops were assembled in the specified areas: Addis Ababa, Were Illu, Ashenge, and Mekele. About
two-thirds of these troops were raised through the Geber Madriya system. The Emperor himself
mobilised some 35,000 troops, commanded by his court officials. His Queen — Empress Taitu —
also mobilised her own force of some 6,000 men.
The Imperial Army also included troops raised by governors-general, such as Ras Makonnen (the
father of Ras Tafari Makonnen, later Emperor Haile Selassie I) who commanded some 12,000
troops. Dejazmatch Tesema commanded some 5,000 soldiers; Ras Welde Giorgis about 5,000; Ras
Bitwoded Mengesha Atakim, about 6,000; and so on. Troops of the regional princes numbered
about 35,000, and of these, Ras Mengesha of Tigré commanded about 8,000; King (Negus) Tekle
Haimanot of Gojjam about 6,000; Ras Welle of Begémder another 6,000; Wagshum Guangul of Wag
a further 5,000.
In all, Menelik (shown at left) was able to mobilise some 70,000 to 100,000 modern rifles for
Adwa. By 1895, he had obtained at least 5,000,000 cartridges. He had spent more than $1-million
(in 1895 currency), a sum which would have been unthinkable to Emperor Téwodros, or even
Emperor Yohannes IV. And this sum did not even include the artillery which Emperor Menelik had
secured. This component of the force — the Corps of Gunpowder and Shell — was commanded by
a Bejirond: a treasurer in charge of finance and the storehouse of the Palace, and by the Lij Mekuas,
who was also commander of the Royal cavalry.
The logistical tail of the Adwa campaign, from the Ethiopian side, was no less impressive than the
logistical effort put forth to carry and support the invading force of some 17,000 Italian troops from
Europe, supplemented by local recruits. Italy had already occupied the highlands of Eritrea, and
therefore was well-placed with forward support for the battle. Moreover, it was aware of the
problems which had been challenging Ethiopia and Menelik. Famine and internecine squabbling
were preoccupying the country, and Menelik was initially unable to mobilise forces to resist Italy’s
occupation of Eritrea and its expansion into the hinterland. An emboldened Italy pushed further
into Ethiopia, crossing the Mereb River and chasing out Ras Mengesha, the ruler of Tigré; full
control of the region seemed at hand, and Italian forces settled in for a permanent occupation.
Italian General Baraterie, commander of the occupation force and governor of the Eritrean colony,
sought and obtained an additional budget of four-million lira and 10,000 more trained troops. But
Gen. Baraterie seemed unaware of Menelik’s main strategic imperative, which was to wait for the
opportunity to confront — with infantry and artillery — the main Italian force and its supplies,
rather than engage in piecemeal battles at the enemy’s choosing. To this end, Menelik focused his
efforts on building a large coalition force, capable of the mission. This entailed a process of
diplomacy with the regional princes and rulers, not only to secure the participation of their
individual armies, but also to be able to access their logistical support base.
The strategy and tactics employed by Menelik were not only due to the Emperor’s diplomatic and
military skills, but also to the unique doctrines developed by Ethiopia literally over several
millennia. These doctrines were also created in virtual isolation from the military lessons learned
by the rest of the world, and reflected Ethiopia’s own history and topography. In this sense, then,
the Ethiopian forces under Menelik did not conform to the expectations of the Italians. As a result,
the Battle of Adwa was to become a significant case study for military schools for the next century,
and almost certainly well into the future.
It would not be fair to say that the Italians had failed to study Ethiopian military history. But by
basing their perspectives on the very different strategies of the Rist-Gult system used by Téwodros
and Yohannes, they could not comprehend the vastly superior mobilisation capabilities of Menelik’
s Geber Madriya system. Thus, when the Italians expected to meet a force of about 30,000
Ethiopians, they met instead some 100,000.
Having said that, the Geber Madriya system was based on a form of recompense to the soldiers
which involved grants of land and the payment of food, drink and honey, etc., to the soldiers from
tenants working the land. In other words, it was a non-monetarised system which provided for the
welfare of the troops. As a result, it was not a system which could be projected far beyond the
supporting geography. The Battle of Adwa came in such a way that — because Emperor Menelik
had lured the Italian main force into his own territory — it fitted perfectly the criteria of the Geber
Madriya system. But Menelik, after the stupendous victory at Adwa, could not use the same
structure to pursue the Italians into Eritrea and throw them entirely into the Red Sea.
The result was that, although Ethiopia was, as an Empire, saved by the Battle of Adwa, the Italians
remained lodged on the periphery. More importantly, the concept of seizing Ethiopia remained in
the Italian psyche, so that when fascist Italy once more dreamed of empire in the 1930s, it again
embarked upon an attempt to conquer Ethiopia. And, in that campaign, even though they met with
initial success, it was once again an overreaching of Italian resources and Italy was thrown not only
out of the Ethiopian heartland but also out of Eritrea. Thus, less than 50 years after Adwa, Eritrea,
too, was restored to Ethiopia.
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Ethiopian Cathedrals ~
Churches ~ Temples
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Ethiopia's Electorial Law
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Ethiopia is Africa's oldest independent country and its second largest in terms of population. Apart
from a five-year occupation by Mussolini's Italy, it has never been colonised. It has a unique
cultural heritage, being the home of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church - one of the oldest Christian
churches.
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The Rise of the Kingdom of Axum!
ANCIENT AXUM ON THE HORN OF AFRICA
The Axumites lived in the Ethiopian highlands near the Red Sea, and so enjoyed a strategic position
in the trade routes between Yemen (in the south of the Arabian peninsula) and the cities of Nubia.
They spoke a strongly Semitic language and wrote in Semitic characters; Ethiopia, in fact, has one
of the longest continuous literate traditions in Africa.
We know very little about the early Axumite kingdom. Roman and Greek sources indicate that an
Axumite kingdom was thriving in the first century AD; the city of Adulis is frequently mentioned
because it had become one of the most important port cities in Africa.
Axum lay dead in the path of the growing commercial trade routes between Africa, Arabia, and
India. As a result, it became fabulously wealthy and its major cities, Adulis, Axum, and Matara,
became three of the most important cosmopolitan centers in the ancient world. Although they
were off the beaten path as far as European history is concerned, they were just as cosmopolitan
and culturally important in that they served as a crossroads to a variety of cultures: Egyptian,
Sudanic, Arabic, Middle Eastern, and Indian. Perhaps an indication of this cosmopolitan character
can be found in the fact that the major Axumite cities had Jewish, Nubian, Christian, and even
Buddhist minorities.
In the second century AD, Axum acquired tribute states on the Arabian Peninsula across the Red
Sea, conquered northern Ethiopia, and then finally conquered Kush. The downfall of the Nubian
powers led to the meteoric rise of Axumite imperial power. The Axumites controlled one of the
most important trade routes in the world and occupied one of the most fertile regions in the world.
The Axumite religion was actually derived from Arabic religion. It was a polytheistic religion which
believed that the gods controlled the natural forces of the universe. However, in the fourth century,
Ezana, who was a follower of Axumite religion, converted to Christianity under the tutelage of a
Syrian bishop named Frumentius. Ezana declared Axum to be a Christian state , thus making it the
first Christian state in the history of the world, and began actively converting the population to
Christianity.
Ethiopian Christianity was slightly different from its Greek origins. Under the influence of Egyptian
Christians, the Axumites believed that Christ had a single rather than a double nature (man and
god): this is called Monophysite (mono=single, physis=nature) Christianity and was considered
heretical in the European churches. In the fifth century AD, the Axumites replaced Greek in the
liturgy and began using their own native language, Ge’ez. Finally, because of their Semitic origins,
the Ethiopians believed that they were descendants of the Hebrews, who were also Semitic. They
traced their origins all the way back to David. So the Ethiopians, unlike other Christians, really saw
themselves as inheriting the covenants that Yahweh entered into with his chosen people (as a side
note, the Ethiopic Church claims to have the Ark of the Covenant which is the chest in which the
Decalogue was kept by the Hebrews).
Axum remained a strong empire and trading power until the rise of Islam in the seventh century
AD. However, because the Axumites had sheltered Muhammed’s first followers, the Muslims never
attempted to overthrow Axum as they spread across the face of Africa. Even though Axum no
longer served as a center or hub of international trade, it nonetheless enjoyed good relations with
all of its Muslim neighbors. Two Christian states north of Axum, Maqurra and Alwa, survived until
the thirteenth century when they were finally forced by Muslim migration to become Islamic.
Axum, however, remained untouched by the Islamic movements across Africa. Because of this, the
Ethiopic (or Abyssinian) Church has lasted until the present day. It is still a Monophysite church
and its scriptures and liturgy are still in Ge’ez.
Source: Ras-ijah Eternalfyah ~ FB Post 7 November 2017
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=896197637196837&set= a.145045225645419.33225.100004198273846
&type=3&theater
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Growth and Structure of the
Economy
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Developments up to l974
By African standards, Ethiopia is a potentially wealthy country, with fertile soil and good rainfall
over large regions. Farmers produce a variety of grains, including wheat, corn, and millet. Coffee
also grows well on southern slopes. Herders can raise cattle, sheep, and goats in nearly all parts of
the country. Additionally, Ethiopia possesses several valuable minerals, including gold and
platinum.
Unlike most sub-Saharan African countries, Ethiopia's resources have enabled the country to
maintain contacts with the outside world for centuries. Since ancient times, Ethiopian traders
exchanged gold, ivory, musk, and wild animal skins for salt and luxury goods, such as silk and
velvet. By the late nineteenth century, coffee had become one of Ethiopia's more important cash
crops. At that time, most trade flowed along two major trade routes, both of which terminated in
the far southwest in the Kefa-Jima region. From there, one route went north to Mitsiwa via Gonder
and Adwa, the other along the Awash River valley to Harer and then on to Berbera or Zeila on the
Red Sea.
Despite its many riches, Ethiopia never became a great trading nation. Most Ethiopians despised
traders, preferring instead to emulate the country's warriors and priests. After establishing a
foothold in the country, Greek, Armenian, and Arab traders became the economic intermediaries
between Ethiopia and the outside world. Arabs also settled in the interior and eventually
dominated all commercial activity except petty trade.
When their occupation of Ethiopia ended in 1941, the Italians left behind them a country whose
economic structure was much as it had been for centuries. There had been some improvements in
communications, particularly in the area of road building, and attempts had been made to establish
a few small industries and to introduce commercial farming, particularly in Eritrea, which Italy had
occupied since 1890. But these changes were limited. With only a small proportion of the
population participating in the money economy, trade consisted mostly of barter. Wage labor was
limited, economic units were largely self-sufficient, foreign trade was negligible, and the market for
manufactured goods was extremely small.
During the late l940s and 1950s, much of the economy remained unchanged. The government
focused its development efforts on expansion of the bureaucratic structure and ancillary services.
Most farmers cultivated small plots of land or herded cattle. Traditional and primitive farming
methods provided the population with a subsistence standard of living. In addition, many nomadic
peoples raised livestock and followed a life of seasonal movement in drier areas. The agricultural
sector grew slightly, and the industrial sector represented a small part of the total economy.
By the early l950s, Emperor Haile Selassie I (reigned 1930- 74) had renewed calls for a transition
from a subsistence economy to an agro-industrial economy. To accomplish this task, Ethiopia
needed an infrastructure to exploit resources, a material base to improve living conditions, and
better health, education, communications, and other services. A key element of the emperor's new
economic policy was the adoption of centrally administered development plans. Between l945 and
l957, several technical missions, including one each from the United States, the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and Yugoslavia, prepared a series of
development plans. However, these plans failed to achieve any meaningful results, largely because
basic statistical data were scarce and the government's administrative and technical capabilities
were minimal.
In 1954/55 the government created the National Economic Council to coordinate the state's
development plans. This agency, which was a policy-making body chaired by the emperor, devoted
its attention to improving agricultural and industrial productivity, eradicating illiteracy and
diseases, and improving living standards for all Ethiopians. The National Economic Council helped
to prepare Ethiopia's first and second five-year plans.
The First Five-Year Plan (1957-61) sought to develop a strong infrastructure, particularly in
transportation, construction, and communications, to link isolated regions. Another goal was the
establishment of an indigenous cadre of skilled and semiskilled personnel to work in processing
industries to help reduce Ethiopia's dependence on imports. Lastly, the plan aimed to accelerate
agricultural development by promoting commercial agricultural ventures. The Second Five-Year
Plan (1962-67) signaled the start of a twenty-year program to change Ethiopia's predominantly
agricultural economy to an agro-industrial one. The plan's objectives included diversification of
production, introduction of modern processing methods, and expansion of the economy's
productive capacity to increase the country's growth rate. The Third Five-Year Plan (1968-73) also
sought to facilitate Ethiopia's economic well-being by raising manufacturing and agro-industrial
performance. However, unlike its predecessors, the third plan expressed the government's
willingness to expand educational opportunities and to improve peasant agriculture. Total
investment for the First Five-Year Plan reached 839.6 million birr (for value of the birr--see
Glossary), about 25 percent above the planned 674 million birr figure; total expenditure for the
Second Five-Year Plan was 13 percent higher than the planned 1,694 million birr figure. The
allocation for the Third Five-Year Plan was 3,115 million birr.
Several factors hindered Ethiopia's development planning. Apart from the fact that the government
lacked the administrative and technical capabilities to implement a national development plan,
staffing problems plagued the Planning Commission (which prepared the first and second plans)
and the Ministry of Planning (which prepared the third). Many project managers failed to achieve
plan objectives because they neglected to identify the resources (personnel, equipment, and funds)
and to establish the organizational structures necessary to facilitate large- scale economic
development.
During the First Five-Year Plan, the gross national product (GNP--see Glossary) increased at a 3.2
percent annual rate as opposed to the projected figure of 3.7 percent, and growth in economic
sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and mining failed to meet the national plan's targets.
Exports increased at a 3.5 percent annual rate during the first plan, whereas imports grew at a rate
of 6.4 percent per annum, thus failing to correct the negative balance of trade that had existed since
l95l.
The Second Five-Year Plan and Third Five-Year Plan anticipated that the economy would grow at
an annual rate of 4.3 percent and 6.0 percent, respectively. Officials also expected agriculture,
manufacturing, and transportation and communications to grow at respective rates of 2.5, 27.3,
and 6.7 percent annually during the Second Five-Year Plan and at respective rates of 2.9, l4.9, and
l0.9 percent during the Third Five-Year Plan. The Planning Commission never assessed the
performance of these two plans, largely because of a shortage of qualified personnel.
However, according to data from the Ethiopian government's Central Statistical Authority, during
the 1960/61 to 1973/74 period the economy achieved sustained economic growth. Between 1960
and 1970, for example, Ethiopia enjoyed an annual 4.4 percent average growth rate in per capita
gross domestic product (GDP--see Glossary). The manufacturing sector's growth rate more than
doubled (from 1.9 percent in 1960/61 to 4.4 percent in 1973/74), and the growth rate for the
wholesale, retail trade, transportation, and communications sectors increased from 9.3 percent to
15.6 percent.
Relative to its neighbors, Ethiopia's economic performance was mixed. Ethiopia's 4.4 percent
average per capita GDP growth rate was higher than Sudan's 1.3 percent rate or Somalia's 1
percent rate. However, Kenya's GDP grew at an estimated 6 percent annual rate, and Uganda
achieved a 5.6 percent growth rate during the same 1960/61 to 1972/73 period.
By the early l970s, Ethiopia's economy not only had started to grow but also had begun to diversify
into areas such as manufacturing and services. However, these changes failed to improve the lives
of most Ethiopians. About four-fifths of the population were subsistence farmers who lived in
poverty because they used most of their meager production to pay taxes, rents, debt payments, and
bribes. On a broader level, from 1953 to 1974 the balance of trade registered annual deficits. The
only exception was l973, when a combination of unusually large receipts from the export of
oilseeds and pulses and an unusually small rise in import values resulted in a favorable balance of
payments of 454 million birr. With the country registering trade deficits, the government
attempted to restrict imports and to substitute locally produced industrial goods to improve the
trade balance. Despite these efforts, however, the unfavorable trade balance continued. As a result,
foreign grants and loans financed much of the balance of payments deficit.
Source: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/etsave/et_03_01.html
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Louis Farrakhan Speaks Out: Holy Ethiopia,
King Haile Selassie I & the Ras Teferians Testimony
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Black Lions ~ Our Glory ~ A Tribute to our Ethiopian Warriors
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Mother Africa
Source: video created by Doni Glover
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Nothing is hidden from God's view!...
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Copyright © 2011-2019 UMOJA Connection, Inc.
All rights reserved.
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